

The illusion of Living God “Arahitogami” and “State Shinto”: What invoke Absolute God?

Part 2 The Illusion of “State Shinto”

Chapter4 What was the theory of "Shrine Shinto as a ‘non-religion’”?

Is "religion" immutable?

There was no legal duty of individual citizens to visit shrines, nor was there de facto the coercion before the Manchurian Incident, and it was only after 1940 that the legal duty of religious groups began. Then it is clear that the conventional explanation as follows of the theory of "Shrine Shinto as a ‘non-religion’" is completely wrong: This theory was designed to cover up the contradiction between the duty of the subjects to visit shrines and the freedom of religion granted by the Imperial Constitution. So what was the theory all about? The purpose of this chapter is to explain changes of its meaning. Before we can begin, however, there is one task that must be done beforehand: to get rid of the stereotypes about “religion”.

Criticizing the theory of "Shrine Shinto as a ‘non-religion’", Miyazawa Toshiyoshi wrote, "It is clear that Shinto Shrines are essentially religious" (*Constitution II*, p. 349). This argument lacks the insight that we cannot see phenomena themselves, we can only perceive them through ideas or concepts, and that they are not Immutable but generating and changing, so that human perceptions may be completely different in different times. In other words, we see things through colored glasses, and if the color of the lenses changes, it is only natural that we see the same thing in different colors.

Now, then, is the concept of "religion" today the same as it was in the early Meiji period? It is not the same. In the early Meiji period, the concept of "religion" did not exist. Rather, it was born and changed through the modern experience of renewed contact with the West. If we compare the concept of "religion" to a measure, the measure itself, which determines what is a religion, did not exist or has been changing, so there is no way that we can take up Shinto shrines, which are measured by the measure, and declare super-historically that they are

essentially religious.

I said that in the early Meiji period there was no concept of "religion". The reason why I said so is that there was no word to express the concept of religion that we recognize today. It is impossible for the concept to exist without a word to express it. So did the word itself not exist in the early Meiji period? Yes, it did. Today, the Japanese language uses the word "Syūkyō" to express the concept of religion. The word "Syūkyō" certainly existed. However, the meaning of "Syūkyō" was "the highest state of Buddhism and the discourse or teaching to attain it", and to simplify it, "Syūkyō = Buddhism". In this sense, both Shinto and Christianity were not "Syūkyō" at all.

In Japan, the word "Syūkyō" began to be used as the word that encompassed various religions as it is used today when it began to be used as a translation of the foreign word "religion" in treaties with foreign countries. However, the translation of the word "religion" was not suddenly fixed as "Syūkyō". In the early Meiji period, the word "religion" was translated in various ways, such as "Syūshi", "Shinkyō", and "Shinto". It is said that it was in 1884 or 1885 that the term was fixed as "Syūkyō".

With the opening of the country, the Japanese encountered the overarching concept of "religion" and began to search for a translation of it. At the same time, they began to search for the contents of the concept of "religion". But they could not spend enough time searching in a quiet environment. This was because, in order to be recognized by the Western powers as a modern state, it was necessary to recognize freedom of religion and separate it from the government as soon as possible, while promoting the reform of religious institutions necessary for modernization.

In the course of this search, the contents of 'religion' came to be understood as common denominators between Buddhism and Christianity. It was "the practice of proselytizing and funeral rites for the salvation of the individual soul". And Shinto, which had not been involved in such things in Edo period, came to be understood as not being a 'religion'.

Based on the above natural flow of the concept, after the "*Daikyōin Bunri Undō*" by the *Jyōdo Shinsyū* sect and the "*Saijin Ronsō*" in the Shinto, the policy of

banning proselytizing and funeral rites for Shinto priests of “*Kankokuheisya*” was adopted, and the theory of "Shrine Shinto as a ‘non-religion’” emerged as an administrative concept. In other words, shrines were not forcibly made non-religious in order to cover up something, but in the process of the creation of the concept of "religion" at the end of the Edo period and the beginning of the Meiji period, the concept of "Shrine Shinto as a ‘non-religion’” was also created as a counterpart to it. Since then, religious policies has been developed around the two concepts that were created and their changes.

Katō Genchi, who severely criticized the theory of "Shrine Shinto as a ‘non-religion’”, also stated that at the time of the creation of the concept "it was a wise policy, and for a time this measure was successful" (*Jinja Mondai no Saikentō*, April 1933, p. 44). Why, then, did he come to criticize it? Kato says as follows. “The times are advancing rapidly and scholarship is gradually broadening its horizons. Since the nineteenth century the civilizations of the East and the West have made rapid progress. The study of religion has made it no longer possible to accept the position that Shrine Shinto are not a religion.” "For this reason, there are few Shinto priests today who do not agree in their hearts that Shrine Shinto is a religion" (ibid.p.44).

In other words, the popular view of "religion" changed through the importation of the discipline of religious studies, which attempted to grasp religion as broadly as possible, and through its domestic development. Taking his cue from the Kato’s description, Yamaguchi Teruomi argues that the Japanese view of religion became very different in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (*Maiji Kokka to Syūkyō* [Meiji State and Religion]). Ironically, by the time the government separated the Shinto Shrine Bureau and the Religious Affairs Bureau and clarified its position on the Shinto shrines as "non-religion", the people's view of religion had already begun to change, and it was becoming difficult for them to accept Shinto shrines as "non-religion" in a simple manner.

The change of “political meaning”

There is no doubt that the change in the way the Japanese people viewed religion in the modern era has been hidden from our eyes since the end of the war, and that this has been the cause of widespread misinterpretation about the theory of

“Shinto shrines as ‘non-religion’”. But that is not the only reason. There is another major factor. The theory of “Shinto shrines as ‘non-religion’” had been constantly reversing itself, depending on the circumstances of the times, in favor of either the Shrine Shinto or the religious forces that opposed it. This fact, too, has been neglected. The political meaning of the theory for both forces was also changing rapidly.

It was during *Daikyōin Bunri Undō* (the movement to separate from *Daikyōin* by *Jōdo Shinsyū*) that the theory of “Shinto as ‘non-religion’” was first mentioned as a concept that had to be considered in specific policy decisions. In this movement, the *Jōdo Shinsyū* side said, “Shinto is not a religion. If it were a religion, the government would not be able to force the people to perform Shinto rituals!”, and upset the government, which was committed to the unity of Shinto rituals and government policies. On the other hand, at that time, the Shinto side took the position of Shinto as a religion, saying that the unity of Shinto rituals and government policies must be the unity of religion and politics.

In order to understand the changes in religious policy in the early Meiji period, it is necessary to bear in mind the historical relationship between religions and *Hanbatsu*: clan factions (vassals of powerful feudal lords who occupied major positions in the Meiji government). To put it simply, the *Cyōsyū* [A feudal lord in present-day Yamaguchi Prefecture] clan faction had been allied with the *Jyōdo Shinsyū* since the Warring States period, and in particular the *Cyōsyū* clan was inextricably linked to the *Nishi Honganji* sect of the *Jyōdo Shinsyū*, which strongly supported the *Cyōsyū* at the end of the Edo period. The fact that Temple monks at the end of the hierarchy from *Cyōsyū*, such as Shimaji Mukurai, were able to assume leading positions in the *Nishi Honganji* sect after the Meiji Restoration, cannot be considered without reference to their relationship with the *Cyōsyū* clan faction. On the other hand, the *Satsuma* [A feudal lord in present-day Kagoshima Prefecture] clan faction, which was as powerful as the *Cyōsyū* clan faction in the Meiji government, had believed in the *Fukko Shinto* advocated by Hirata Atsutane and forbade the faith of *Jyōdo Shinsyū*. As a result, the *Jyōdo Shinsyū* was not able to do missionary works in *Satsuma* until the defeat of Saigō Takamori in the *Seinan War* of 1877. Because of this stark difference in sentiment between *CyōsYū* and *Satsuma* towards *Jyōdo Shinshū*, the religious policies depended on which clan faction was in control of the Majji government.

Kyōbusyō [the Ministry of Missionary] , which was established in 1872 for the purpose of the joint propagation of Shinto and Buddhism, had originally been decided to create in response to a proposal by Shimaji Mokurai and others. However, by the time it was actually established, both Kido Takayoshi, the leader of the *Cyōsyū* clan faction, and Shimaji were in Europe as members of missions to Europe. And it was Saigō Takamori of the *Satsuma* clan faction who ran the government as the chief executive. In this way, it is easy to understand why the three deities of creation became enshrined in the *Daikyōin*, which was set up as a joint training and preaching center for Shinto and Buddhism.

On his return from Europe, shocked by this current situation, Shimaji moved the *Jyōdo Shinsyū* to develop *Daikyōin Bunri Undō*, the theoretical underpinning of which was the theory of "Shinto as a 'non-religion'". And the movement was successful because Saigō was defeated in the so-called *Seikanron* [the Dispute within the Japanese government over whether to send an envoy to ask for an apology for the rudeness of the Korean government to the Japanese government and to urge them to open their country.], a large number of officials from Satsuma left the government, and the real power of the Ministry of Missionary transferred to the *Cyōsyū*.

The success of the *Daikyōin Bunri Undō* led to the government's recognition of the *Jyōdo Shinshū*'s claim that they respected Amaterasu as the ancestor of the Emperor, but that they could not revere three deities of creation because the reverence conflicted with the *Jyōdo Shinshū*'s faith. From then on, in contrast to their attitude towards Shrine Shinto, *Jyōdo Shinshū* had always maintained a pious attitude towards imperial rituals. This attitude was essentially the same in Christianity of Japan. In other words, in the early Meiji period, an agreement was reached that "ancestor worship, especially of the emperor's ancestors, is a moral value that Japanese people should have in common, regardless of religious differences", and this agreement continued until the defeat of Japan. As a result, there were no disputes about imperial rituals such as the "Shrine Problem".

In order to monopolize the missionary and funeral services, when *Saijin Ronsō* [the Pantheon Dispute in 1881] arose, *Jyōdo Shinshū* urged that the government should prohibit the Shinto priests from conducting religious

activities such as missionary services and funerals. Fearing that if the Shinto priests continued to proselytize, internal strife would ensue, which could even damage the authority of Amaterasu, the Ministry of Interior accepted the *Jyōdo Shinshū*'s argument. However, the government only adopted the argument of *Jyōdo Shinshū* in this matter in order to settle the dispute, and did not intend to operate the whole shrine policy on the theory of "Shrine Shinto as a 'non-religion'". Therefore, when it became necessary to stop the supply of public funds to shrines in order to rebuild the government's finances, the government did not mind taking the position that shrines should be maintained by the faith of the people. This was the "*Kankoku Heisya Hozonkin Seido*". Up to this point, the theory of "Shinto as a 'non-religion'" and the theory of "Shrine Shinto as a 'non-religion'" derived from it had acted to change reality in favor of *Jyōdo Shinshū*.

At the beginning of the Meiji period, Shinto shrine's territories were confiscated under the guise of "*Kokka no Sōshi*" [public ritual facilities] , and the succession of shrines by Shinto priest's family was banned. Nevertheless, in practice, the government switched its policy towards shrines from being terminal shrines to being identical to temples and, in the end, even prohibited missionary work and funerals. The prefectural shrines and below became already treated as shadows. "Now that we are already trapped to this point. Let us accept the theory of "Shrine Shinto as a 'non-religion'" imposed on us, and use it as a lever to get the government to carry out its declaration of "*Kokka no Sōshi*" at the beginning of the Meiji Era and to re-establish the *Jingikan*." This was the logic of the Shinto priests who developed the "*Shingikan Kōhuku Undō*" (my book, *Kindai Seikyō Kankei no Kisoteki Kenkyū [A Basic Study of The Relationship between Politics and Religion in Modern Japan]* ,1997).

As a result of more than ten years of the "*Jingikan Kōhuku Undō*", in 1900 *Syajikyoku* [the Department of Shrines and Temples of the Ministry of the Interior] was divided into two departments, *Jinjakyoku* [the Department of Shrines] and *Syūkyōkyoku* [the Department of Religious Affairs] , and the theory of "Shrine Shinto as a 'non-religion'" became the official position of the government. In addition, in 1906, the government adopted the "*Kankoku Heisya Kokko Kyōshinkin Seido*" and the "*Fukensya-ika Shinsen Heihakuryō Kyōshin Seido*", which reaffirmed that all shrines were "*Kokka no Sōshi*". At the same time, *Chihōkyoku* [the Regional Department] ,the provincial department of the Ministry

of the Interior, began to make active use of shrines as central facilities for local self-government.

The theory of "Shrine Shinto as a 'non-religion'" was first advocated in order for the *Jyōdo Shinshū* to gain freedom of missionary work and to take away missionary work and funerals from shrines. However, due to the aforementioned changes in the situation, it has turned into a logic that justifies the visit to shrines in primary schools and, in some areas, can even force people to set up of a Shinto altar in their houses and to accept and enshrine the *Jingū-Taima* [a symbol of Ise Grand Shrine] . However, this logic was originally put forward by *Jyōdo Shinshū*, and, it included the argument that "the government follow this logic, it can make the whole nation participate in Shinto rituals" in order to make easier for the government to accept. Therefore, *Jyōdo Shinshū* could not deny the logic outright now that it had become a disadvantageous logic for them.

Then, *Jyōdo Shinshū* and Christian groups demanded that the shrines must become thoroughly de-religious, i.e. become expression of ethical or monument. As the public's view of religion had been changing, this demand became more and more influential, and at last there became expressed a sense of crisis in the shrine community that the shrines could be practically destroyed if the influence continued to grow. This was the situation in 1929 or 1930. In this way, the secretaries of *jinja Seido Cyōsakai* [The Committee to Study the Shrine Shinto System] began to think of ways to abandon the theory of "Shrine Shinto as a 'non-religion'", recognize shrines as "religion" and realize a system of political and religious relations on a par with Europe.

However, as a result of The Sophia University affair after the Manchurian Incident, Catholics recognized that shrine visits were a "non-religious" act. Here again the stakes were reversed, and the theory of "Shrine Shinto as a 'non-religion'" became a disadvantageous logic for *Jyōdo Shinshū* and Christianity.

It is clear from what we have seen so far that the theory of "Shrine Shinto as a 'non-religion'" was not deliberately created by the government for any particular purpose, but was an idea that emerged from the common sense of the people at the time and the interests and power relations of religious groups and clan factions [*Hanbatsu*] , and changed its political meaning in conjunction with

changes in these factors.

The Suppression against religions by "State Shinto"?

So far, I have taken up and clarified the fallacies of the two theories that form the basis of the State Shinto illusion: the theory that shrine worship was forced upon the people, and the theory that the theory of "Shrine Shinto as a 'non-religion'" was created and used to force shrine worship to the people. I think that this is enough, but there are two other secondary factors that I would like to mention briefly. One of them is the theory that suppression of religions was carried out by State Shinto. The following cases are often mentioned as examples; the suppression of *Tenrikyō* in the early Meiji period; the suppression of *Ōmotokyō* in the Taisyō period; the suppression of Sectarian Shinto Orders around 1935; and the suppression of Buddhist Orders or Christian Orders that had developed anti-war and anti-military speeches after 1935.

The major drawback of this theory relates to the actors who carried out the suppression. If it had been the Shinto priests or schoolteachers who carried out the suppression, it would have been within the framework of the theory of "State Shinto", but this was not the case and it was the police. Therefore, in order to claim that it was a suppression by the "State Shinto", it is necessary to incorporate the police into the elements of the "State Shinto", and to explain the reality of the suppression of religion by analyzing the thoughts, actions, and ground laws of the police. However, there are few such empirical studies. As far as I know, there are only three people who have written articles paying attention to this point. None of them incorporate the police into the State Shinto, nor do they see the State Shinto as the cause of the repression.

One of them, Ashizu Uzuhiko, in an article entitled "Teikoku Kenpō Jidai no Jinja to Syūkyō [Shrines and Religion in the Age of the Imperial Constitution] ", argues as follows;

"In the days of the Imperial Constitution, the most commonly applied law for the suppression of new religions was *Keisatsuhan Syobatsurei* [the Order for Punishment by Police Officer] . Article 2 of The Order states: 'Any person who falls under any of the following items shall be punished by detention for a period of less than thirty days or by a fine of less than twenty yen' and lists thirty-

seven items of offenses. Items 16 to 19 of the list are as follows;

16) Those who spread rumors and lies that upset people.

17) Those who confuse people by preaching that happiness or misfortune will come to them without any evidence, or by offering prayers for it, or by distributing charms.

18) Those who interfere with the medical treatment of a sick person by performing religious acts or giving him sacred paper or water in order to cure him.

19) Those who hypnotize people unreasonably.

Anyone committing any of the above acts could easily be punished at the police without any judicial proceedings. Most of the doctrines of the new religions, which discussed disasters, happiness or misfortune, were punished under items 16 and 17 of this order. They were punished for spreading rumors without any scientific basis or happiness or misfortune without any evidence, confusing people. Even today, many new religions offer prayers to sick persons, or give them divine paper, water or medicine. Such acts were punished as interfering with scientific medicine. Since these punishments could be carried out quickly and easily by the police alone, most of the new religions were destroyed before they could form large sects.

After WW II, Some have become argued that the suppression of the new religions was a form of oppression of other religions by State Shintoism, but this would be a mistake. The ideology on which the *Keisatsuhan Syobatsurei* was based was not that of State Shinto, but that of enlightened scientific rationalism. Therefore, it should be called the oppression of religion by enlightened scientific rationalism." (pp. 245-246)

The second commentator to argue the relationship between the police and the suppression of religion is Itō Takashi. He writes about the reason why the Public Order Maintenance Law [*Chian-iji-hō*], originally enacted to destroy the Communist Party, was used after 1935 to arrest such religious groups as *Ōmotokyō*, *Shinkō-bukkyō-seinen-dōmei*, *Tenri-honmichi*, and *Nippon-tōdai-sya*. "The arrest was unimaginable from the point of view of the origin of the Public Order Maintenance Law. It is true that the oppressed new religious groups acted in cooperation with the right-wing groups and they tried to infiltrate the Army and the Imperial Court, as Miyashita also stated (*Tokkō no Kaisō* [Recollections of the Special High Police], p.140 and following). However, even so, it cannot be said that the application of the Law to these activities was natural. As the reason

for it, I can't afford not to assume the logic of the organization that although the original target, the Japanese Communist Party, had been destroyed, the huge Special High Police organization, the Ideological Prosecutor's organization, and the related bureaucratic organization remained and had to be maintained" (*Syōwaki no Seiji* [Politics in the Syōwa Period] , Tokyo: Yamakawasyuppansya, p.352)

In other words, according to Itō, the Special High Police were forced to create jobs because they felt that if they lost their duties they would not be able to maintain their organization, and they expanded their interpretation of the Public Order Maintenance Law to suppress religious groups

Fukuzawa Yukichi once argued in his famous article "Teishitsuron [Reflections on the Emperor] " that "in Japan, those who are involved in politics and make policy decisions should have a belief not to abuse the dignity and sanctity of the emperor". If Itō is right, then t the Special High Police abused the "authority of the Emperor" and the "Dignity of the National Polity" in order to protect themselves, and as a result, they committed an incredibly grave crime by which the Emperor and Shinto were subjected to unjustified criticism for years to come.

The third commentator to argue the relationship between the police and the suppression of religion is Kojima Nobuyuki. In his article; "Tokubetsu Kōtōkeisatsu niyoru Shinkyō Jiyū Seigen no Ronri [The Logic of the Restriction of Religious Freedom by the Special Higher Police] " (*Syūkyō to Syakai* [Religion and Society] , No.14, June 2008), Kojima reviews the "*Dai Niji Ōmoto Jiken* [The Second Ōmoto Incident] " (December 1935) and the "*Hito no Michi Kyōdan Jiken* [The *Hitonomichi* Order incident] " (September 1936), about which previous studies have described as "two major incidents of disrespect for the Emperor". He examines whether the common belief is appropriate or not, that the Special High Police suppressed the *Kōdō Ōmoto* and the *Hito no Michi Kyōdan* with the intention of cracking down on "heretical theories" about the "national polity".

Kojima read the *Tokkō Geppō*, a monthly magazine published by the Police Security Bureau in the Ministry of Interior, and extracted the reasons for the suppression. He found that in the case of the *Second Ōmoto Incident*, *Kōdō Ōmoto* attracted the attention of the *Tokkō* because of its links with secular revolutionary political movements, particularly its advocacy of the negation of

capitalism and parliamentary systems, which it also shared with communism, and was finally arrested as a revolutionary movement aiming to usurp the Emperor's throne. This analysis reveals that the Second *Ōmoto* Incident was not a suppression on "heretical theories", but an expansion of the scope of "anti-establishment movements" from social movement groups (especially the Communist Party) , which was the original target of the crackdown by *Tokkō*, to religious groups.

In the case of the *Hitonomichi* Order incident, the police cracked down on the Order by the reason why from an Enlightenment-rationalist point of view, it was regarded as a "superstition", which 'threatens individual life and disrupts the social order'. While it is true that 'the doctrines of disrespect against the Emperor' was an issue in both cases, Kojima says that the point was not emphasized at the time of the police arrests, but later at the trial stage.

The primary purpose of the suppression against *Kōdō Ōmoto* by the Special High Police was to crack down on the revolutionary movement, and the primary purpose of the suppression against the *Hitonomichi* Order was to crack down on the conducts against public order and morals, which the Special High Police judged to be superstitious and fraudulent. In other words, the crackdown on 'the doctrines of disrespect against the Emperor' was not the main objective.

In another article, "Jiyūken・Minsyusei to Tokkōkeisatsu—'Tokkō Kyōhon' wo Daizai to shite— [The relationship between freedom, human rights and the Special High Police: 'Commentaries of the Special High Police' as a subject] " (*Syūkyōhō* [Religious Law] , No.29, September 2010), Kojima analyzes what the Special Higher Police were trying to protect in the first place, using the overviews and commentaries on the Special Higher Police (*Tokkō Kyōhon*) published in the prewar period as a source. As a result, He found that from the establishment of the Special High Police in 1912 until the enforcement of *Kokka Sōdōin Hō* [the National Mobilization Law] in 1938, the target of the crackdown was illegal social movements (communist or fascist movements) that were anti-parliamentary and anti-private property, and that the aim of the crackdown was to protect the idea of the modern Western individualism and liberalism and the constitutional monarchy based on and the parliamentary system and private property. However, with the enactment of the National Mobilization Law, the "state system" itself took

an "180-degree turn" towards a totalitarian one centered on a controlled economy, and as a result, individualism and liberalism became the target of the crackdown, and in line with this turn, the "proclamation of *Kōdō* [The way of life in line with Japan's national polity]" was newly added to the "supreme objective of the Special High Police". According to the results of Kojima's research, the conventional understanding of the "suppression against religion" by "State Shinto" is a fallacy that overlooks the transformation of the Empire of Japan around 1938 and the accompanying dramatic changes in the targets of the Special High Police's crackdown.

Even after this explanation, there may be still people who want to deny the Emperor and Shinto at all costs, whether there is evidence or not. They say: "Even if ideas of protecting the Emperor and Shinto were not the direct cause of the suppression against religions, they were used to suppress them. Ideas that can be misused must be rejected." Such argument would be an irrational abusive language. If we must deny ideas that are used for some evil purpose, the first idea that must be denied should be "democracy", which has reigned brilliantly as a war slogan in the 20th century (Hasegawa Michiko, "「Kaminokuni」 Hatsugen ni Mimi wo katamukeyo [Listen to the statement of 'Deity's Country'] ", *Nihon wa Kami no Kuni dewa nainodesuka* [Japan is a 'Deity's Country', isn't it?], ed. Kaji Nobuyuki, Tokyo: Syōgakukan).

Are foreign shrines also "State Shinto"?

There are those who call the policies of shrines or religions in Korea and Taiwan "State Shinto". However, I have always thought that it is too sloppy a theory to equate policies in new territories, which have different legal systems and competent authorities, with those in the mainland without any verification. Therefore, I would like to investigate the real situation on the Japanese mainland first, and then, if there is room, on Korea and Taiwan.

However, some readers may think it unsatisfactory that, after writing so much about "State Shinto", I have not mentioned the shrines of Korea and Taiwan at all. So I went back to the research books I had at hand and found that their shrine policies have largely kept pace with those of mainland Japan. Today, the biggest problem of the shrine policy in the overseas territories, as in mainland Japan, is

considered to be the problem of forced worship of shrines. Let's take a look at the history of Korea and Taiwan, focusing on this issue.

Firstly, with regard to Korea, to the best of my knowledge, the most detailed and up-to-date academic work on the issue of compulsory worship is *Nihon no Cyōsen Shihai to Syūkyō Seisaku* [Japanese Rule over Korea and Religious Policy] written by Hang Sokuhi [韓哲曦] (Tokyo:Miraisya, 1988).

First of all, Han writes that "Compulsory worship of shrines was almost non-existent in the early years of Japanese rule" (p.158). The total number of shrines in Korea was 36 shrines and 41 small shrines in 1919, and 42 shrines and 108 small shrines in 1924. Japan, by the way, has an area of about 378,000 km², in which there are currently about 88,000k shrines. The Korean peninsula is about 222,000 km², just under two thirds the size of Japan. So in any case, there were absolutely insufficient numbers to force all Koreans to visit shrines (p.163).

On October 15, 1924, the *Cyōsen* Shrine was completed and the ritual of inviting Kami was held. In July of the same year, just prior to the ritual, the *Keijō* [京城] Christian Federation submitted the following request to the Governor-General: "If the shrine contains religious objects, we ask that the school staff, pupils and parents will not be forced to visit it, but be left to their own devices." In response to this request, the Governor-General's Office issued a notice to the prefecture governors under the name of the Director of the Office of School Affairs, entitled "Regarding the Visitation of Shrines by Pupils", as follows: "It is difficult to achieve any educational effect by forcing those who are not agreed to visit the shrine, so please carefully think to the matter and instruct the teachers and staff of the schools under your jurisdiction to avoid any confusion caused by misunderstandings." In other words, the Director admonish governors that shrine visitation should not be compulsory because it is not expected to have an educational effect by the method of compulsion. Taking up this notice, Han wrote that although the Governor-General had built the *Cyōsen* Shrine as the "center of all shrines in *Cyōsen*, but institutionally or ideologically, it could not yet be used as a base for promoting the policy of *Kōminka* [the policy of turning Koreans into Japanese] " (pp.164-169).

It was not until 1932 that the aforementioned policy changed. Hang says that the coercion to visit shrines started at schools and the coercion became more

severe after 1935 (pp.180-196). If he is right, then policy towards shrines in Korea followed much the same process as on the mainland of Japan.

Then, how was the religious policy in Taiwan? The most detailed and up-to-date study on the subject is *Nihon Teikokusyugika Taiwan no Syūkyō Seisaku* [The Religious Policy in Taiwan under Japanese Imperialism] by Tsai Kam Tong [蔡錦堂] (Tokyo:Dōseisya, 1994).

According to Tsai, the religious policy in Taiwan can be divided into three periods: *Hōninki* [The Non-interference Period] , *Cyōsaki* [The Investigation Period] , and *Danatsuki* [The Suppression Period] . The Non-interference Period lasted from the time of Japanese possession of Taiwan in 1888 until around 1914. Under the policy of "*Kyūkan Hozon* [Preserving The Old Customs] ", which was formulated by Minister of Civil Affairs, Gotō Shinpei, in order to ensure effective governance, Taiwan's customs, habits and religion were preserved almost as they were.

The Investigation Period was from 1915 to 1930. In 1915, there was a large-scale uprising by Taiwanese of Han Chinese descent called *Sairaianjiken* [西來庵事件] Incident, and one of the reasons for the incident was thought to be the existence of religion and superstition, which led to a large-scale investigation into religion. However, even at this time, the Governor-General's policy was to "tolerate the superstition of native religions as long as they do not interfere with the interests of Japan or the security of society, and on the other hand, educate the Taiwanese in the 'correct beliefs'" (p.64). For this reason, Taiwanese people were not forced to visit shrines.

The Suppression Period lasted from around 1931 to the end of the war. As in the mainland of Japan, it was triggered by the Manchurian Incident, but Tsai says "it was not until around 1933 that the spirit of respect for Kami and ancestors was strongly demanded" (p.84). In a little more detail, " the demand for the worship of *Jingū-taima* [神宮大麻 a divine paper object issued by Ise Grand Shrine] at home began in 1932, the compulsion to build 'one town, one shrine [一街庄一社]' began in 1934, and the policies such as 'reform and improvement' of Taiwan's native religion began in 1936" (p.11).

It is said that it was in 1934 that the slogan "Shrines as Center" was clearly

announced, but at that time, there were only 25 shrines in Taiwan, and it was impossible to make them central place for local people to honor Kami and their ancestors. Therefore, in September of the same year, the Governor-General issued the "Notice on the Construction of Shrines", which set forth the policy of "*Ichigaisyō-Issya* [一街庄一社 one shrine per township] ". The *Gaisyō* was the lowest administrative unit. If this policy was to be implemented as it was, "about 300 new shrines would have to be built on the whole island of Taiwan" (p.133). However, due to financial and other problems, in the end, even at the end of the war, the number of shrines on the island was only "two official shrines [*Kanpeisya* 官幣社], three national shrines [*Kokuheisya* 国幣社], eleven prefectural shrines [*Kensya* 県社], twenty township shrines [*Gōsya* 郷社], thirty unranked shrines [*Mukakusya* 無格社], *Taiwan-Gokoku-Jinja* [台湾護国神社] and *Kenkō-Jinja* [建功神社], which were a total of sixty-eight " (p.140).

In Taiwan, too, shrine visitation came to be implemented from schools in 1919, and for the general public, it seems to have been strongly encouraged after the Sino-Japanese War. In Taiwan, however, perhaps because of the country's polytheistic climate, "there were not many cases of 'refusal' against shrine visitation" (p.157). Rather, what became a problem in Taiwan was *Taiwanjin Katei Seicyō Kaizen Undō* [台湾人家庭正庁改善運動 the movement for the improvement of *Seicyō* in Taiwanese households] which was carried out as a "byproduct" of the compulsion to worship of *Jingū-taima* [神宮大麻] at home and enshrine Shinto altars, and *Jibyō Seiri Undō* [寺廟整理運 the movement for the consolidation of *Jibyō*] which was enforced under the slogan of "breaking down superstition and improving perverse customs".

The "*Seicyō* [正庁]" is a Taiwanese family altars, and the "*Taiwanjin Katei Seicyō Kaizen Undō*" was an attempt to change the altars into a Japanese style. The "*Jibyō* [寺廟]" is a generic term for Taiwan's traditional religious institutions, which are a mixture of Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism. The "*Jibyō Seiri Undō*" was the movement to reduce the number of the institutions or eliminate them, which raged from 1938 to 1939. This movement is so unpopular that it has been called the "*Haibutsu-kisyaku* [廃仏毀釈 The Abolition of Buddhism]" in Taiwan, as it symbolizes the bad aspects of the "*Kōminka-Seisaku* [皇民化政策 Japanese vassalization policy for inhabitants of new territories]" and attempts to destroy the traditional beliefs of the Taiwanese people. Indeed, this movement

was an outrageous act that had never been carried out even in Korea.

In October 1941, just before the outbreak of the Great East Asia War, the “*Jibyō Seiri Undō*” was cancelled. It is interesting to note that Tsai point to, as one of the reasons for the cancellation of the movement, "the fact that, in connection with Japan's expansion into the South Asia , the “*Jibyō Seiri Undō*” was no longer just a problem of Taiwan, but had become greatly connected with the religious policy and governance of the region" (p.286). The significance of this statement can be clearly seen in the book: *Nihon Tōchi Jidai Taiwan niokeru Jibyō Seiri* [The Consolidation of *Jibyō* in Taiwan under Japanese Rule] by Miyamoto Nobuto, from which Tsai cites the following sentence.

“It should be noted that the *Jibyō Seiri* was used as a propaganda tool by the United States and Britain just before the Great East Asia War. According to a returnee from *Syōnantō* [昭南島 Singapore] , the British advertised to the Malays and overseas Chinese as follows: If the Japanese invaded, they would certainly try to oppress religion. Japan would suppress Islam or the native religion of overseas Chinese and force them to worship shrines. This is exemplified by the *Jibyō Seiri* in Taiwan. When the Religious Measures Operatives in Philippine returned to Japan, they also told that the United States propagated the following: If the Japanese invaded, they would immediately try to suppress Christianity: After that, they would build shrines: In other words, it is the same as the case in Taiwan.”(p.286)

It is worth listening to the suggestion that Japan rushed to stop the "*Jibyō Seiri*" in Taiwan because it was promoted by the US and Britain as a traditional way of Japanese overseas rule. Indeed, Holtom also writes in "*Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism*" that:

"Even more significant for international aspects of Japan's rise to hegemony in the Far East is the fact that the conception of the unity of government and religion has necessitated establishment of shrines to home gods as agencies of political administration. Given the nature of the Japanese state and its inseparable association with Shinto belief and rituals, it is impossible to think of political control apart from a vigorous determination to secure the subordination of conquered populations to the central religious interests of the state. Where go the Japanese armies there go the Japanese gods"(MODERN JAPAN AND SHINTO NATIONALISM, pp.156-157)

And indeed, he cites "The Japanese policy of cultural assimilation in Formosa" of the 1940s as the basis for such a determination (ibid. pp.163-164).

Holtom's argument was carried on by Murakami Shigeyoshi. Murakami wrote of "colonial shrines" as follows:

"As a branch of the 'Sōken-jinja [創建神社 New shrines built after the Meiji Restoration]', there were shrines in the frontier, colonial and occupied areas. Many of these were called 'Kaigai-jinja [海外神社 Overseas shrines]', and most of them were religious institutions that blatantly manifested the invasive nature of State Shinto." "The essence of these shrines was religious aggression based on the doctrine of *Kokutai* [National Polity of Japan], that Japanese gods descend on the land under Japanese control" (*Kokka Shinto*, pp.192-193).

When we understand the changes in shrine policy in Korea and Taiwan, it is clear that the image of "State Shinto" was created, about overseas just as on the mainland, by projection of the real policies after 1930s onto the policies before the period. Incidentally, the Japanese military forces that occupied the Philippines and Indonesia's Lesser Sunda Islands were aware of the anti-Japanese propaganda of the United States and Britain, and, taking into account the strong influence of Catholicism in the regions, sent Japanese Catholic priests to work on propaganda about Japanese military policy (Shimura Tatsuya, *Kyōkai Hiwa — Taiheiyō Sensō wo Meggute* [The Secret Story of the Church: Around The Pacific War], Nagasaki:Seibonokishisya,1991,pp.37-47,pp.137-142). In other word, Not "Japanese gods", but Japanese Catholic priests "descended" on the Philippines and Indonesia's Lesser Sunda Islands.